See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) (pluralist opinion) (response to dicta in Holland by stating that the strength of the treaty is subject to certain constitutional restrictions); Bond v. United States, 134 p. Ct. 2077, 2098 (2014) (Scalia, J. agrees with the judgment) (combined by Thomas, J.) (Describes Holland`s interpretation of the necessary and appropriate clause as consisting of an «unfounded and unciting sentence» that is not supported by the text or structure of the Constitution); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Execution of Conventional Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
1867, 1868 (2005) (argues that the Dutch interpretation of the necessary and appropriate clause «is erroneous and the case should be overturned»). In the 1950s, efforts were made, led by Senator John Bricker of Ohio, to limit the scope of conventional power as described in Holland by a constitutional amendment. One version of the proposed amendment, known as the «Bricker Amendment,» would have provided that a «treaty in the United States would only take effect by statutes that would be valid in the absence of a treaty.» See S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong., Proposals for Amendments to the Treaty Provisions of the Constitution: Opinions of Deans and Professors of Law 3 (1953). No version of the Bricker amendment was ever adopted. In 1904 and 1905, Secretary of State John Hay negotiated a series of treaties that provided for the general settlement of international disputes. For example, Article II of the Treaty with the United Kingdom provided that «in each individual case, the High Contracting Parties, before taking over the Permanent Court of Arbitration, shall conclude a special agreement clearly defining the dispute and the extent of the powers of the arbitrators and specifying the time limits for the formation of the arbitral tribunal and the different stages of the proceedings». 460 The Senate approved the United Kingdom Treaty by a constitutional majority, but first amended it by replacing the word «treaty» with «agreement.» President Theodore Roosevelt, who called «ratification» a rejection equivalent, sent the treaties to the archives. «Historical practice,» Dr. McClure comments, «The compromise by which disputes have been settled includes both treaties and executive arrangements in large numbers.» 461 a statement supported by both Willoughby and Moore.462 The United Nations Participation Act of 20 December 1945 implements these provisions as follows: «The President has the power to negotiate one or two special agreements with the Security Council, which are subject to congressional approval by appropriate law or joint resolution. to make available to the Security Council, at its request for the maintenance of international peace and security, the number and types of facilities and assistance, including the right of passage, to the Security Council when it so requests for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Article 43 of the present Charter.
The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of Congress to take any action with the Security Council, at its request, to take measures pursuant to Article 42 of the said Charter and, under this Agreement or Special Arrangement, the armed forces, facilities or assistance provided for therein: provided that nothing contained in this Agreement to the President is interpreted; to make available to the Security Council, for that purpose, armed forces, facilities or support in addition to the forces, facilities and assistance provided for in such special arrangements or arrangements. »; 464 Compare Bradford C. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1573, 1661 (2007) (arguing that the text and legislative history of the Constitution support the position that treaties and executive agreements are not interchangeable, and also arguing that the supremacy clause should be understood as generally excluding exclusive executive agreements from prevailing over existing law); Laurence H. . . .