On 12 June 2018, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras announced that he would reach an agreement with his Macedonian counterpart, Zoran Zaev, on the dispute “covering all the conditions laid down by the Greek side”.  The agreement was signed on Lake Prespa, which is a partial common border between the Republic of Northern Macedonia, Greece and Albania. The above analysis aims to highlight the potential legal strategies and challenges it has identified in arguing for an objective effect with respect to the denomination system obtained in the Prespa agreement. After the parties demonstrated that the agreement could not be easily reconciled with the notion of objective rules, since the parties have no relevant intentions and after considering what the reference to erga omnes really meant, one might think that the agreement is a linguistic means that is not accompanied by the corresponding guarantees of implementation. In a way, this reference seems to be a political instrument aimed at public opinion and the political scenes of both countries, in order to emphasize as clearly as possible the need to respect the commitments made bilaterally. The only way to obtain Prespa`s agreement against third party opposition could therefore be to confirm the duty of care that arises from the agreement of both parties to permanently require that the naming agreement be properly initiated by third parties. In any event, it is not easy to overcome the restrictions inherent in a bilateral agreement by simply using more robust language with regard to Northern Macedonia`s duties in promoting its new official name. In other words, the argument that a bilateral agreement introduces a public policy regime or collective interests with erga omnes effects feels like it is using tape assistance to correct a bullet hole; This is a sufficiently insufficient means to achieve such an ambitious goal, given the consensual nature of contracting. One possible solution could be the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The inclusion of the agreement in such a resolution and the request of UN member states to respect it effectively, or simply approve the new name in a Resolution of Chapter VII, and invite Member States to implement it, although it is not necessary and imperative for the new regime to be applicable within the organisation, would create a quasi-objective regime that allows its effects to be extended beyond the circle of contracting parties to the Prespa agreement and to increase the legitimacy of the agreement.  While this is exceptional in UNSC practice, this has been attempted in the past. For example, the UN Security Council has called on all states to actively participate in or contribute to the implementation of an agreement, or has called on States to refrain from any measures that could jeopardize or compromise compliance with obligations arising from an agreement.  In addition, in the case of the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the UN Security Council imposed the entry into force of an agreement between the United Nations and Lebanon, which had not been ratified by the United Nations, by annuling it of a Chapter VII resolution and, therefore, granting it to all UN member states.  In this case, however, there is no doubt that a similar scenario is not feasible in the current configuration of political power within the UNSC.